In today’s ever expanding-open source communities, developers rely heavily on third-party libraries and copy-pasted code from community websites like StackOverflow to accelerate productivity. Such a code reuse tendency helps to decrease development time and effort, but also means that vulnerability in shared code (i.e., libraries) gets spread dramatically faster, as occurs in the case of the Zip Slip vulnerability.

This vulnerability is exploited using a specially crafted archive that holds directory traversal filenames (e.g., ../../ The two parts required to exploit this vulnerability are (1) a malicious archive and (2) extraction code that does not perform validation checking.

This post aims to explain how it works, and includes the following additional resources:


The following is a list of vulnerability identifiers:

  • Technical Description: Zip Slip is a form of directory traversal that can be exploited by extracting files from an archive. The premise of the directory traversal vulnerability is that an attacker can gain access to parts of the file system outside the target folder in which they should reside.

  • Who Is Affected: Applications and services using a library which contains the Zip Slip vulnerability, or projects that directly contain vulnerable code, which extracts files from an archive without the necessary directory traversal prevention. A list of vulnerable libraries is updated and maintained by Snyk in a public GitHub repo.

  • Compromise Impact: The attacker can overwrite executable files and either invoke them remotely or wait for the system or user to call them, thus achieving remote command execution on the victim’s machine. The vulnerability can also cause damage by overwriting configuration files or other sensitive resources, and can be exploited on both client (user) machines and servers.


Zip Slip attacks are especially prevalent in Java. The principal reason is that Java does not provide any standard library offering high-level processing of archive files. Consequently, developers have to write their own routines or reuse third-party libraries as dependencies from external repositories.

The Java ecosystem had many more archive libraries than other ecosystems, many of which are known to be vulnerable to Zip Slip attacks. In particular, the Maven Central repository is Java ecosystem with thousands of libraries, and today it is well-known that developers do not update their dependencies frequently.

Let us create a new Maven project and add a new dependency towards the vulnerable library org.zeroturnaround:zt-zip:1.12 in the pom.xml configuration file as is shown below.


Now we can reuse the ZipUtil.unpack() public method provided in this library to unzip any kind of compressed file.

Enumeration<ZipEntry> entries = zip.getEntries();
while (entries.hasMoreElements()) {
   ZipEntry e = entries.nextElement();
   File f = new File(destinationDir, e.getName());
   InputStream input = zip.getInputStream(e);
   IOUtils.copy(input, write(f));

This code shows how the unpack method is implemented. We observe in line #4 that the concatenation of the destination directory and the ZipEntry path name can cause issues since there is no validation that the files stay within the destination directory. For example, an attacker can create a malicious zip file containing files with directory traversal characters in their embedded path and gain access to certain directories or folders in the file system outside the intended folder and can invoke scripts of overwrite specific files.

There are many tools freely available to create this type of zip exploit files. For instance, the Evilarc Python script can be used to zip an batch executable with the following parameters: python -d 10 -o unix Once unpacked by the victim, the malicious batch script with be copied 10 directories up in the file system were normal users do not have any access.


As we observed, detecting a system with the Zip Slip vulnerability that was already exploited is very hard, as the result of the exploit consists of files on the system that can be located elsewhere. Besides, zip files could either be uploaded to the application or downloaded from within, so both traffic sources should be monitored. The best way to avoid this exploit is by preventing it from occurring, performing the proper unzipping checking and keeping dependencies up to date.